In 1993, relations between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) had sunk to crisis levels. The future of non-proliferation and security of the Korean peninsula hung in the balance as tensions reached level unseen since the end of the Korean conflict in 1953. Steps were taken immediately to remedy the situation and after months of negotiations, the result was the US - DPRK Agreed Framework, which today makes up the heart of US foreign policy towards North Korea. The Framework was deemed a success, and still is by many, although in the nearly five years since its conception, it has drawn ever-growing criticism. Today, in light of several key developments, the Framework is questioned more than ever. This paper will analyze the nature of the Agreed Framework and the arguments of both its supporters and critics in an attempt to better understand the future of relations between the US and the DPRK.

Immediately before the initiation of the Agreed Framework negotiations, North Korea was on the verge of withdrawing form the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). During the summer of 1992, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had made several attempts to inspect suspected nuclear waste storage sites and was halted by Pyongyang. Then in early 1993, as per Article 10 of the NPT, North Korea had given three months warning of its withdrawal from the treaty in response to the repeated pressure to allow the IAEA access to these sites. The world was in a state of near panic for several months as fears of war on the peninsula rose and questions of future security in the region became regular concerns. Finally, the DPRK was persuaded by the majority world opinion and agreed to negotiations with the United States. The result of these negotiations essentially altered US - North Korean relations and laid the foundation for today's policy of engagement.

There were several main objectives covered in the agreement. The first was that the United States would endeavor to replace North Korea's graphite-moderated nuclear reactors with safer and more powerful Light Water Reactors (LWR), which are also more proliferation-resistant. These LWRs will produce more power than the DPRK's current nuclear facilities but will also produce less fissile material that may be later converted into weapons-grade plutonium. While this process is being implemented, it is stipulated that the US will provide 500,000 barrels of petroleum annually to compensate for the power lost due to the freeze on current nuclear power facilities. The next objective is the working towards normalization of relations between the two countries. It is stipulated that initially, the US and DPRK are to open liaison offices which are to eventually be expanded into fully functional embassies. Finally, the agreement renewed North Korean dedication to the NPT a stable environment on the Korean peninsula.

Since the framework was established, relations between all parties have, on the whole, improved. The Four Party Talks, which have been underway since 1997, have the goal of establishing a permanent peace treaty for the peninsula that will replace the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean War. At the very least, this establishes communication and engagement between the powers. Also, via the formation of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), contact has been secured and cooperation enhanced between the participating members of the global community and North Korea.

The ties between North and South Korea have strengthened immeasurably as a result of the DPRK's recommitment to a North-South dialogue under the agreement. Contacts have been established on the governmental level which were not present before the framework, and closer cooperation has been necessitated through shared projects such as the LWR construction. Furthermore, there has been additional cooperation between the North and South in terms of air traffic control and telecommunications across the border.

US - DPRK relations have also taken a substantial turn for the better as a result of the Agreed Framework. The road has been blazed for a normalization of ties between the countries and a more sound dialogue has been established as a de facto result of the work involved in the LWR projects. In addition, North Korea's cooperation has been essential in maintaining the interests of the United States in the region. In particular, US aims of non-proliferation and stabilization of the Korean peninsula have a much greater potential today than 10 years ago as a direct result of the Agreed Framework.

However, in spite of the progress that has been made as a result of the Agreed Framework, its critics have a highly compelling case. Perhaps the most pervasive criticism is that the United States has miscalculated North Korean intentions in one way or another. No policy makers are fool enough to completely trust North Korea and make no attempt to hide that fact, but many people still believe that the Framework is simply a screen for clandestine North Korean activities that may be inconsistent with international laws and agreements.

It is certainly true that North Korea has not had the cleanest record since the signing of the Agreed Framework. Early on, there were two significant incidents that brought North Korean intentions under closer scrutiny. In one, North Korean military personnel were found to have crossed into South Korean territory. In another incident, a North Korean submarine violated South Korean waters. Casualties were involved in the latter incident, which nearly destroyed the Agreed Framework. More recently, the firing of a missile over Japanese airspace was considered by many to be a belligerent gesture and caused Japan to threaten to withdraw from KEDO in protest. While any one of these incidents could be shrugged off to unfortunate chance, the three combine to make a disastrous combination. The empirical evidence at least would indicate that the DPRK is not following the spirit of the Agreed Framework and is operating under some other agenda.

The allies have also discovered difficulties in funding KEDO recently. While 22 countries and the EU have each made contributions to the cause, there remains still a sufficient lack of funds. Naturally, it seems that the United States will shoulder the excess burden in order to preserve the organization and the Framework. Such a gesture, however, compounded with the previously mentioned North Korean actions, is bound to have an impact on the Congress when the vote for funding arises.

It is undeniable that North Korea is obeying its own agenda in making a name for itself in the international community. While it takes every overt opportunity to display compliance and a willingness to work with the international community. Yet, the DPRK has shown in several instances that it does not choose to abide by international norms or follow international law. This is why US policy makers make it clear time after time that North Korea cannot be trusted.

Still, in order to preserve the delicate peace on the Korean Peninsula, the international community must deal with North Korea in some manner. The Agreed Framework has established a method of engaging the DPRK and encouraging them to follow international standards. It allows for the United States to act in such a way as to uphold its security interests in the area and also provides North Korea with a glimmer of international acceptance.

The question of whether North Korea should be trusted is moot - clearly it cannot. Still, this should not affect the functioning of the Agreed Framework. The framework is a non-binding agreement that gauges progress on a basis of visible results rather than trust. The factor of trust will most likely affect the methods in which the Framework is implemented for years to come, however, the structure itself will not be shaken by this. As long as all parties involved keep a watchful eye for a worst case scenario while at the same time struggle to achieve the goals of the framework, the prospect of a stable and peaceful Korean Peninsula remains a reality.

"Agreed Framework on the Nuclear Issue," October 21, 1994.

Dae-Sook Suh and Chae-Jin Lee, ed. North Korea After Kim Il Sung. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).

Deming, Rust. Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. July 14, 1998.

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