The world seemed like it was becoming a safer place in the 80's and early 90's. The Soviet Union had collapsed and along with it the Cold War. As arms reduction agreements were being passed between the two superpowers, countries that had been developing nuclear weapons such as Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, and Taiwan were voluntarily dismantling their own and joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapons states. Even the newly formed Soviet republics that had fully developed nuclear stockpiles in their possession, such as Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, voluntarily disarmed for economic incentives. Then, in 1993, the upward trend hit a wall.

 North Korea, a member of the NPT since 1985, announced its withdrawal the agreement in 1993. U.S. diplomatic action quickly followed as a growing nuclear arsenal at Youngbyon was suspected. On the brink of war, the 1994 Framework Agreement was signed by the two countries. In the Framework, North Korea agreed to give up its nuclear program in exchange for 500,000 tons of fuel oil each year until the completion of two light water nuclear reactors, both of which would be delivered by the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). It also vowed to remain a party to the NPT. Then, in September 1998, a U.S. spy satellite detected a large excavation project at Kumchang-ni believed to be a new station for the development of nuclear weapons. A halting of U.S. oil and food ensued as inspections of the facility were denied. In the beginning of March 1999 a deal was finally struck to allow for inspections in exchange for a pilot food program, but the question begs itself: why should a member of the NPT be bribed to allow confirmation of its non-nuclear weapon status?

 North Korea is just part of a growing trend that has non-proliferation remaining a dream rather than a reality. The acquisition of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons by rogue states is inevitable and policy is growing to reflect that.

 A watershed moment in this policy shift occurred on March 19 as the U.S. House of Representatives passed the National Missile Defense Act of 1999 in response to the Rumsfield Commission's findings that the threat of an inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) attack on the U.S. by a rogue state was increasing. The very nature of the act that calls for the deployment of a national missile defense (NMD) is in violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia. If the 1972 ABM Treaty is broken, the breaking of other arms agreements with the former Soviet Union will follow. The second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) would have reduced deployed nuclear warheads on both sides by more than 10,000 apiece, but it stipulates that the 1972 ABM Treaty must remain in place for it to be in effect. Not only would the world be at greater risk with a larger number of deployed nuclear weapons, but the United States and Russia risk violation of the NPT. 

As nuclear weapon states, the two powers are obligated to make substantial reductions in their nuclear arsenals toward complete disarmament in the future under Article VI of the NPT. Russia and the U.S. had satisfied this requirement with the START treaties, but the elimination of those treaties would necessitate unilateral reductions to comply with the NPT. Russia will have to do this anyway with a weakening economy that is incapable of sustaining current nuclear forces, but the United States will have to choose what a credible nuclear deterrent will be. 

Nuclear weapons may be the only type of weapon which can be checked for non-proliferation. Testing of nuclear devices creates large seismic disturbances that can be detected by NPT members, but chemical and biological weapons are harder to detect. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) banned the production, storage, and use of chemical weapons on April 29,1997; however, even this agreement has had its problems. The U.S. has voiced opposition to inspection of its soil for testing, despite declarations of destroying its stockpiles. Other problems for the CWC are the nation-states of Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria. These four countries are all alleged to have chemical weapon programs, but none of them are members of the CWC. The Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BWC) faces a greater challenge: it has no means to enforce its agreement. Unlike the establishment of a technical secretariat by the CWC to check up on its members, the BWC never stipulated an enforcement arm when it was signed in March 26, 1975. One will likely be added during its revision conference in 2001, but an ad hoc group, VEREX, has to do the job in the meanwhile.

Non-proliferation remains a challenge for the United States and other countries which wish that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) had never been conceived. The continued proliferation by countries which either develop WMD capabilities on their own, or buy them from the larger powers (i.e.- Pakistan from NPT member China), will not end as long as WMD provides an increased status in the balance of power rather than a lower one.

 Krepon, Michael. "Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reemerging Threat?" Great Decisions, 1999, 43-54.

 "National Missile Defense, the ABM Treaty and the future of START II." Arms Control Today, November/December 1998, 7-19. 

 Proliferation:Threat and Resopnse. US Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., November 1997, 32-33. 

"The Arms Race Revisited." Current History, April 1997. 

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