RESPONSIBLE BELIEVING

S. Joel Garver

CHAPTER EIGHT

Responsible Believing:
Intellectual Virtue and Real Existing Knowledge

Section III

Some progress was made in respect to responsibility for belief in those cases where beliefs are formed in a praiseworthy manner (and not merely formed permissibly) and where lack of belief is blameworthy (and not just where beliefs were formed in a prohibited manner).

Beliefs are specifically praiseworthy, for the most part, either when they represent some sort of epistemic accomplishment or when they rise above the bounds of epistemic duty (the acquired belief forming processes are, in some sense, "supererogatory"). The first sort of case is represented when, for instance, a child learns to recognize objects for the first time or achieves a new level of earning or when a mentally challenged individual makes an epistemic achievement beyond what they had done before. Thus, believing that animal to be a wolf and not just a big "doggy" is a praiseworthy accomplishment for a five year old. The acquisition of such beliefs requires the learning of a new doxastic practice or a new way of engaging in a doxastic practice already possessed. They are not usually simply applications of already possessed practices in new contexts, though that is also sometimes the case. And so, these sorts of cases are praiseworthy achievements.

The second sort of case is represented, for instance, when an individual makes an effort to interpret a difficult text or when a medical professional is able to make accurate snap diagnoses in a high-pressure triage situation. This kind of case differs from the first case since it focuses on a specific kind of praiseworthy achievement in which not only is something achieved, but moreover was achieved in a way that goes beyond the ordinary sorts of cases for which the practice(s) in question was designed or in the face of adverse conditions that could well interfere in the functioning of the practice that is engaged in. In going above and beyond what the practice(s) was more narrowly crafted to achieve, such epistemic achievements are, in a sense, "su pererogatory."

There are also cases in which a lack of belief is blameworthy. Some such defective processes of belief-formation fall under very general epistemic norms which would apply to any other normally functioning adult in the same situation. For instance, in some situations a person is blameworthy if he does not know the date of President McKinley's assassination or the name of the assassin. Such a case obtains if the subject did not bother to look it up when she was supposed to or if she read a chapter carelessly despite the fact that it was assigned and there was opportunity to do so. The individual in question possessed the requisite doxastic abilities but failed to exercise them or exercised them carelessly when there was no relevant barrier to doing o therwise.

Some such defective processes of belief-formation fall under epistemic norms, though the violation would be seen mostly in ethical terms. Thus, a bus driver is blameworthy if she didn't know there was a person standing in front of her bus when she pulled out of the driveway because she stayed up all night partying and is exhausted. This is, I think, first a matter of moral censure ("What were you doing driving a bus in that condition!") and secondarily and derivatively an epistemic matter ("If you had any sense you would have gotten enough sleep and would have seen the person!"). The moral norms are ones that are tied to epistemic norms: it is both immoral and epistemically wrong (insofar as epistemology is relevant) to drive a bus without a reasonable amount of sleep. Whether there are any cases in which the epistemic norm logically (or otherwise) depends upon the moral norm will be touched on below.

And some such defective processes of belief-formation fall under very specific epistemic norms (and perhaps ethical ones as well) that apply to only certain portions of the population or certain individuals. Thus we expect a radiologist to see the shadow in the mammogram though we have no similar expectation for the technician. Or we expect the man who has been married to Lucia for the past thirty years to be able to read her moods and be attentive to her needs in ways different and deeper than, say, Lucia's favorite butcher. These sorts of cases involve norms and epistemic virtues that are requisite only for people who have acquired certain doxastic practices, who identify (or claim to identify) with particular epistemic ends, who possess particular epistemic gifts or talents (artists, musicians, rhetoricians, and so on), or who are expected to have some other epistemically significant trait that is specific to them or to a population of which they are a member (e.g., a specific belief-facilitating emotional attachment).

All of the points made thus far come together to articulate a perspective on human belief and knowledge which has responsibility for belief as an essential component. I believe this perspective to have been articulated persuasively throughout the previous chapters and thus to be established. From here, let us turn to two subsidiary points that follow from what has been argued.