Joel Garver - Responsible Believing - Chapter Two: Section Two

RESPONSIBLE BELIEVING

S. Joel Garver

CHAPTER TWO

On What the Queen Told Alice:
Willing to Believe

Section II

Hume's voice is joined by others in picturing belief as a passive phenomenon--it is for us a condition that one undergoes. We will have time later to critique this notion of passivity. On that type of account, however, the impossibility of believing at will is not a conceptual one, but is a psychological fact about us as human beings. In his "Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification" William P. Alston argues for this psychological impossibility.

In respect to cases of basic voluntary control Alston appeals to introspective experience--the phenomenology of belief--to verify the impossibility of believing at will. Confusion on this matter may stem from a conflation of the power to believe at will with other powers we have, but are distinct. For example,

If I were to set out to bring myself into a state of belief that p, just by an act of will, I might assert that p with an expression of conviction, or dwell favorably on the idea that p, or imagine a sentence expressing p emblazoned in the heavens with an angelic chorus in the background intoning the Kyrie of Mozart's Coronation Mass. All of this I can do at will, but none of this amounts to taking on a belief that p. It is all show, an elaborate pretense of believing. (1989b:122-3)

Even if a belief were to occur, it would only be as a result of this effort and, thus, would not count as basic control.

Lest we think Alston's argument only strikes at beliefs that are clearly true or false--those formed by, e.g., introspection, memory, or perception--he also considers philosophical, religious, or high level scientific beliefs. In these areas, as well as in matters of practical, action-guiding considerations, we may be presented with incompatible positions that have evidence equally supporting either alternative. Quite often, however, it seems that we come to believe one side or another. Can such situations be construed in terms of basic control over belief? Perhaps this is possible sometimes, answers Alston, but in almost every case there is a better way of construing the situation. Various construals include:

[1] Cases in which "the belief follows automatically, without intervention by the will, by the way things seem at the moment to the subject":

[a] Cases of (subjective) certainty: "belief is determined by that sense of certainty, or, alternatively, by what leads to it, the sensory experience or whatever"; or

[b] Cases of (subjective) uncertainty: "belief is still determined by what plays an analogous role, the sense that one alternative is more likely than the others, or what leads to that"; or

[c] Cases of (subjectively) perfectly equivalent alternatives: no belief arises, but rather indecision;

[2] "Acceptance" of a proposition in the absence of a significant subjective probability:

[a] Cases of a working hypothesis: the subject resolves to act as if p were true as a basis for action with no belief concerning the truth of p at all; or

[b] Cases of belief seeking: the subject is seeking to bring herself into a position of believing p; or

[c] Cases of assertion: the subject asserts that p; or

[d] Cases of alignment: the subject aligns herself with a group that is committed to certain doctrines. (1989b:125-7)

None of these cases, however, count as belief.

It seems then, that in respect to basic voluntary control of belief, it is a psychological fact about us that we cannot choose our beliefs. What is the nature of this psychological fact? Here Williams may provide some insight. While his account is aiming to show an incoherence in the idea of choosing beliefs, he crucially depends upon some psychological notions: that if we could acquire a belief at will irrespective of its truth, we would "know it"; that the incoherence in question involves "full consciousness" of willing belief acquisition; that if such acquisition were possible, we could not "seriously think" of the mental state acquired as a belief; that the state could not in "full consciousness" be considered a belief; and that with regard to no belief could we even "suspect" that it was acquired at will (1973:148).

Williams takes basic voluntary control to be the sort of action or condition that is transparently apparent to a (human) subject. Concerning this he is, I think, correct, though he is wrong regarding some of his other points. The problem, then, with believing at will is not a formal contradiction, but a phenomenological discrepancy between what it is like to act in a basically voluntary way (which would be apparent to a subject who was doing it) and what it is like to acquire a belief. Pojman argues in this fashion:

1 Phenomenologically speaking, acquiring a belief is [at least typically] a happening in which the world forces itself upon a subject.

2 A happening in which the world forces itself upon a subject is not a thing the subject does (i.e., is not a basic act) or chooses.

3 Therefore, phenomenologically speaking, acquiring a belief is not something a subject does or chooses. (1986:159)

While Pojman's formulation of [1] might be expressed in a more nuanced way (so as to account for beliefs regarding what is internal to us and beliefs shaped by interpretive configurations we place upon the world), his argument draws the essential point: basic actions are, obviously, actions--things we do--while beliefs are passive--things that happen to us.

Let us continue. Alston also considers the possibility that we possess nonbasic immediate voluntary control over belief. In respect to ordinary perceptual, introspective, and memory propositions as well as obvious inferences, we have as little nonbasic immediate control over belief as we did basic control. One would like to know how to go about inhibiting, producing, or withholding a belief in an nonbasic immediate way. As Alston writes,

How would I do so? What button would I push? I could try asserting the contrary in a confident tone of voice. I could rehearse some skeptical arguments. I could invoke the Vedantic doctrine of maya. I could grit my teeth and command myself to withhold the proposition. But unless I am a very unusual person, none of these will have the least effect. (1989b:129)

Beliefs just don't come about this way. They, on the contrary, happen to us. Again Alston considers situations in which the truth of a proposition is unclear (the religious, philosophical, high level scientific cases and the like). Arguments in favor of nonbasic immediate control in these cases are obvious (cf. Chisholm 1968:224). It is clear that we have control over whether to keep looking for evidence or reasons, where to look, what to look for, how to arrange and weigh the evidence, etc. Even if such activities successfully led to beliefs in every case they would not establish the fact that we have nonbasic immediate control--or so Alston argues. The reason is that there is a difference between "doing A in order to bring about E, for some definite E, and doing A so that some effect within a certain range will ensue." The scenario we need to show nonbasic immediate control is one in which "the search for evidence was undertaken with the intention of taking up a certain particular attitude toward a particular proposition." (1989b:130)

Let us now briefly turn to long-range voluntary control. According to Alston long-range voluntary control "is the capacity to bring about a state of affairs, C, by doing something (usually a number of different things) repeatedly over a considerable period of time, interrupted by activity directed to other goals" (1989b:134). In respect to belief perhaps we have an example in the ability of some physically or sexually abused children to bring themselves to withhold belief that they are being abused (or to believe that they are not being abused) by a prolonged process of self-hypnosis (Finkelhor 1984; Briene and Conte 1993). More ordinary cases might employ "selective exposure to evidence, selective attention to supporting considerations, seeking the company of believers and avoiding nonbelievers, self-suggestion," and the like. Blaise Pascal and his wager also come to mind in which he addresses the one bound by unbelief,

...learn from those who were once bound like you, and who now wager all they have. These are people who know the road which you wish to follow, who have been cured of the affliction of which you wish to be cured: follow the way by which they began. They behaved just as if they did believe, taking holy water, having masses said, and so on. That will make you believe quite naturally, and will make you more docile. (1966:152)

Doubtlessly some people are sometimes successful in such attempts. It seems, however, that we lack sufficient control of this sort to ground any sort of overall responsibility for belief or epistemic normativity at least insofar as prohibition, requirement, and permission are thought to be attached to particular beliefs. People simply are not generally and sufficiently successful in bringing about an attitude of belief towards the propositions which they want to believe.

In light of the failure of basic and nonbasic immediate forms of control and the limitedness of long-range control we must now turn to what Alston calls "indirect voluntary influence".